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Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc.: IMPLICATIONS OF
DOUBLE TAXATION IN MISSISSIPPI WRONGFUL DEATH AWARDS
Thomas 0. Depperschmidt*
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of Mississippi wrongful death damage theory is to maintain the
economic position of surviving beneficiaries as they were in their pretort condi-
tion.1 Maintaining that position means the amount awarded to beneficiaries
should not include the decedent's personal living expenses, since those expenses
represent payments out of income that would not have been received by beneficia-
ries in any event. 2 The Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law in Smith v.
Industrial Constructors, Inc. ,' included in the definition of living expenses the de-
cedent's personal income taxes, also to be deducted from the award. 4 Tax deduc-
tion was mandated to ensure that the economic position of beneficiaries was
maintained but not enhanced by the decedent's death, i.e., it avoids making the
decedent worth more dead than alive.'
The court, in attempting to prevent unjust enrichment, unintentionally dimin-
ished the fair return due the beneficiaries. For while the damage award to benefi-
ciaries is itself tax free, the interest earnings on the invested award are taxable.
When taxation of the decedent's income is also introduced into the award calcula-
tion, the total consequences of income taxation on the beneficiaries' position are
* Professor of Economics, University of Memphis. Ph.D., University of Texas at Austin, 1965; B.A., Fort Hays
Kansas State University, 1958.
I. Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc., 783 F2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986). The Smith Court recognized
that Mississippi's goal was one "of awarding the beneficiaries the amount, but only the amount, that the decedent
reasonably would have, and could have, contributed to them." Id. That guideline interprets § 11-7-13 of the
Mississippi Code Annotated, which provides:
In such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages allowable by law as the jury may
determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all dam-
ages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 11 -7-13 (Supp. 1994).
2. Smith, 783 F.2d at 1254-55.
3. 783 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
4. Id. at 1253.
5. Louisville & N. Ry. v. Garnett, 93 So. 241,243 (Miss. 1922).
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quite serious. Those effects have not been analyzed thoroughly, being mentioned
in only a few court decisions' and analyzed in several economic studies.7
This Article tracks Mississippi case history on the tax deduction rule. It exam-
ines the legal justification of that rule as it relates to maintaining the economic po-
sition of beneficiaries. A numerical example is developed to demonstrate the
effects of double taxation. Without the double tax, beneficiaries are assured the
same economic position as before the decedent's death. With the tax, a serious de-
terioration in the economic position of beneficiaries occurs. If the tortfeasor in-
sists on a tax on the decedent's earnings, the court in fairness should increase the
defendant's payment to compensate the beneficiaries for the double tax they must
pay. If the tortfeasor is required to make that payment to maintain the household's
economic position, however, he is no better off with the court imposing a tax on
the decedent's income. The effects of double taxation on beneficiaries and the tort-
feasor call into question the continuation of the tax deduction rule in Mississippi
wrongful death actions.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCOME TAX
DEDUCTION RULE IN MISSISSIPPI
The progression of court rulings applying Mississippi law to wrongful death
damages crystallized over seven decades into the present interpretation.' The first
step was the development of rules on "present value" and deduction of "living ex-
penses."
A. Pre-Sheffield Damage Theory Developments
The early rules developed the damages theory framework: (1) the award must
provide only the present value of future income payments to beneficiaries, and
(2) the living expenses of a decedent must be deducted in award calculation. The
first step was announced in the 1920 decision New Deemer Manufacturing Co. v.
Alexander.' The jury was instructed to reduce to present value any "reasonable
compensation" the decedent would have earned during the remainder of his life."0
New Deemer also hinted at a requirement to deduct living expenses of the decedent
6. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282
F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 (9th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 573 F.2d
726 (3d Cir. 1976); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Leming v. Oilfields Trucking
Co., 282 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1955); Margevich v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 116 N.E.2d 914 (Ill. App. Ct.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 861 (1953); Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1952).
7. See Robert H. Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 Aiuz. L. REv.
272 (1966); Yehuda Kahane & Aaron Yoran, Compensation for Loss of Income and Its Taxation:A Policy Analysis,
32 NAT'L TAx 1. 117 (1979); Robert J. Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 Ouso ST. L.J.
212 (1958); Joseph J. Benich, Jr., The Reverse Tax Effect in Wrongful Death or Injury Cases, TRIAL, May 1981, at
16-20, 58; Dennis Brady, et al., Calculating the Effects ofIncome Taxes on Lost Earnings, TRIAL, Sept. 1982, at
65-68, 84; John 0. Ward & Gerald W. Olson, The Economic Impact ofIncome Tax on Damage Awards, TRIAL,
Aug. 1981, at 47.
8. Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc., 783 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1986).
9. 85 So. 104 (Miss. 1920).
10. Id. at 106.
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from the award. The trial court's jury instruction had allowed "not only what he
would have earned, without diminution for his own support, but also such addi-
tional amount as it would take to support his wife and children."11 The jury in-
struction was found to be in error by the Mississippi Supreme Court because it
could be interpreted as allowing an award of both the decedent's earnings and the
support the decedent would have provided.12 The error apparently was not in in-
cluding the present value reduction of the award or subtracting a "living expense"
from the award. 13
In Hines v. Green, 4 the same court expanded the award calculation require-
ments. The court first spelled out the procedure for determining the present value
of an award, using the current legal rate of interest of six percent as the discount
factor for future earnings. Then, the court said, from the value so found "must be
deducted the expenses that would have been incurred by the deceased on his own
account in living and supporting himself during the period of his [life] expect-
ancy."
16
The following year, in Louisville & Nashville Railway v. Garnett,17 the court
elaborated on those principles. It rejected the trial court's award determination be-
cause the lower court had authorized the jury to determine the "present cash value
of the amount [the] deceased would have earned during his life expectancy with-
out making any deduction for his living expenses."18 The Louisville Court went on:
"It is argued that measuring [the] deceased's life expectancy in the manner autho-
rized by . . . [the jury] instruction made him more valuable to his family dead
than alive, and that is true."19 The court cited New Deemer and Hines in support of
its prescribed method for determining the present value of the decedent's future
earning capacity."
The court did not maintain perfect consistency over the years in its position on
deducting living expenses. In 1956, in Illinois Central Railroad v. Sanders,21 for
example, the court held rather emphatically that living expenses were not a de-
ductible item in determining "value of the life expectancy."22 The court stated that
11. Id. at 107.
12. Id. at 106.
13. Id. at 107.
14. 87 So. 649 (Miss.), cert. granted sub non. Davis v. Green, 257 U.S. 627 (1921), and rev'd, 260 U.S. 349
(1922).
15. Hines, 87 So. at 653.
16. Id.
17. 93 So. 241 (Miss. 1922).
18. Id. at 242.
19. Id. at 243.
20. Id.
21.90 So. 2d 366 (Miss. 1956), overruled by Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So. 2d 1314 (Miss. 1981).
22. Sanders, 90 So. 2d at 373.
1995]
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"[tihe earning capacity of a man is what he is capable of earning and is not what he
is capable of saving.""
This about-face on the theory of deductibility of living expenses the court had
crafted in litigation preceding and including Louisville was itself reversed in
Dickey v. Parham. 24 There, the court again stated that for the decedent, the proper
element of damage was "the present net value of his own life expectancy. '"25
B. The Sheffield Rule on Living Expenses
The second step in development of Mississippi law on wrongful death damages
was the Mississippi Supreme Court's definitive resolution of the differences in de-
cisions" on the rule of deductibility of living expenses. In Sheffield v. Sheffield, 27
the court established the rule that "the living expenses of the deceased should be
deducted from the present cash value of the deceased's life as set forth in Louis-
ville."28 The court ruled further that "[u]pon request of the defendant, a jury in-
struction embracing the living expenses deduction principle will be granted ."29
The Sheffield rule was the essential next step in the analysis of tax deductibility
from the earnings of a decedent since the Mississippi Supreme Court thereby re-
moved any question on the requirement that living expenses be deducted.3" That
ruling set the stage for the third step, that income taxes on the decedent's earnings
are included as part of living expenses.
C. Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc.:
Income Taxes As Living Expenses
In Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc. ,31 the Fifth Circuit made explicit the
state law basis for its ruling -that in diversity cases," 'state law governs the mea-
sure of damages.' "32 The court also admitted at the outset of its analysis that there
23. Id. This comment suggests several things. The court may have found that all of the decedent's income was
being used for his maintenance (i.e., the decedent saved nothing), so that deduction of living expenses would
leave a zero net income for award purposes. On the other hand, the court may have been conscious of a distinc-
tion between all living expenses and those considered necessary to support life and an ability to earn.
24. 295 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1974).
25. Id. at 285 (footnote omitted). The term "present net value" was not explained, but presumably means fu-
ture lost earning capacity net of living expenses.
26. In Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So. 2d 1314, 1318 (Miss. 1981), the court noted rulings not requiring de-
ductibility of living expenses in Jeffreys v. Clark, 168 So. 2d 662 (Miss. 1964), and Illinois Central Railroad v.
Sanders, 90 So. 2d 366 (Miss. 1956), overruled by Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So. 2d 1314 (Miss. 1981), in con-
trast to the text-cited cases requiring deductibility.
27. 405 So. 2d 1314 (Miss. 1981).
28. id. at 1318.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Hines v. Green, 87 So. 649 (Miss.), cert. granted sub non. Davis v. Green, 257 U.S. 627
(1921), and rev'd, 260 U.S. 349 (1922); New Deemer Mfg. Co. v. Alexander, 85 So. 104 (Miss. 1920)).
31. 783 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). Only two issues were contested on appeal: the allowance of prejudgment
interest and the reduction of a wrongful death award by the amount of income tax payable on earnings. Id. at
1250-51.
32. ld. at 1250 (quoting Murphy v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 628 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Weakley
v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975))).
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was "no explicit Mississippi authority" to guide the court's determination of
awards for future earnings by an income tax reduction.
33
The Smith Court then recounted the pertinent provisions of Mississippi's
wrongful death statute: " 'In such action the party or parties suing shall recover
such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all
the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and
all parties interested in the suit.' ""
The objective of this statute the Smith Court found in the New Deemer decision:
"'to furnish compensation for the injuries received to the parties suing for the
death of the deceased, they having the right to sue for the value of the life under the
statute.' ,,35 Out of that objective, the Smith Court delineated a specific "guiding
principle, a more specific damage standard for wrongful death," in three ele-
ments, the third of which it found to be most pertinent: "[t]he sum the deceased
might have received as the present net value of his own life expectancy. "36
The court then formulated the rule of recovery: "[T]his measure consists of the
present value of the decedent's estimated future wages less the decedent's esti-
mated living expenses, calculated over the decedent's life expectancy. 37 In stating
the theory of damages under the Mississippi wrongful death statute within those
guidelines, the Smith Court then mandated the subtraction of income taxes from
the decedent's earnings.38 It analogized to the Mississippi rule that subtracts living
expenses from a damage award: "If we were to add the phrase 'income taxes' to the
phrase 'living expenses' .. it would also complement the Mississippi goal of
33. Id. at 1252.
34. Id. (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 11 -7-13 (Supp. 1994)).
35. Id. (quoting New Deemer Mfg. Co. v. Alexander, 85 So. 104, 107 (Miss. 1920)).
36. Id. The two other "elements of damage suffered," noted but not emphasized by the court, were: "(I) [g]ra-
tuities that the [statutory beneficiaries] had a reasonable expectation of receiving[; and] (2) [l]oss to all the bene-
ficiaries of the deceased's society and companionship." Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
37. Id. (citing Louisville & N. Ry. v. Garnett, 93 So. 241, 243 (Miss. 1922)). In a nutshell, this dictum identi-
fies the four key economic elements in an award calculation:
(1) estimated wages (or earning capacity) paid periodically;
(2) an estimated deduction of the decedent's living expenses (to give the net figure required);
(3) some measure of life expectancy; and
(4) all future values are reduced to present value.
38. Id. at 1253. The statement of the "measure of recovery" in a Federal Employer's Liability Act case is also
clear in Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493 (1980): " 'the damages. . . [that] flow from
the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might have reasonably received.' "Id. (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913)).
19951
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
awarding the beneficiaries the amount, but only the amount, that the decedent rea-
sonably would have, and could have, contributed to them. 39
The court later reaffirmed this critical point:
The portion of the decedent's earnings that would have gone toward income taxes
could not have been contributed to the beneficiaries if the decedent had lived. Like
the decedent's estimated future living expenses, the failure to subtract estimated fu-
ture income taxes from the award would place the beneficiaries in a better position
because of the decedent's death.40
The emphasis here clearly was on the award not exceeding the amount the dece-
dent would have contributed to the beneficiaries. Perhaps this concern that "the
decedent's beneficiaries . . . would be in a better position because of his death
than they would have been had he lived"41 caused the court to ignore the prospect
that its ruling could cause the beneficiaries to receive less than the proper amount.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TAX DEDUCTION ISSUE:
THREE ARGUMENTS FOR NONDEDUCTION REJECTED IN Smith
The Smith Court discussed briefly three arguments against deducting income
taxes from damage awards, and rejected all three. Those arguments are especially
relevant to a fourth argument (the effect on the award sum of a tax on award earn-
ings) that was only implicit in the discussion, but which has implications for the
validity of the tax deduction rule.
39. Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc., 783 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986). Perhaps in knowing the di-
rection it wanted to go on living expenses and not the final destination, the Smith Court, maybe unwittingly, re-
vealed the importance of the tax deduction. The court did not identify explicitly the possibility of a "second tax."
It is in that direction, however, that the consequences of taxation in terms of beneficiaries being in the same,
better, or a poorer position because of the tax are found. Indeed, the court presented a telling passage:
Of course, evidence on the decedent's future taxes is only evidence-evidence subject to challenge just
as other evidence is subject to challenge. If, for example, because of the nature of the income or other-
wise, the decedent was entitled to tax exemptions, deductions, credits or the like, such evidence is clearly
admissible to show that tax liability on lost earnings would not have reduced the decedent's contributions
to the beneficiaries to the extent contended, if at all. . . .This estimate [of tax liability] could then be
challenged with evidence that the decedent's personal situation required higher or lower rates.
Id. at 1254 (citation omitted).
While this passage does not provide explicit consideration of any tax consequences after the grant and the (pre-
sumed) investment of the award on the beneficiaries' position, it moves in the direction of at least making implicit
those consequences.
40. Id. at 1253-54. The ruling of the Fifth Circuit on deductibility of income taxes from a decedent's earnings
was reaffirmed in another case applying Mississippi law, Beville v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 960 F.2d 546
(5th Cir. 1992). In Jones v. Shaffer, 573 So. 2d 740 (Miss. 1990), the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered a new
trial where the jury apparently did not weigh in its decision expert testimony involving the present value of a dece-
dent's income (as reduced by a personal consumption factor of 26 %). Id. at 742. The award figure so computed
did not, however, "take into account any taxes that might be paid during the decedent's life, had he lived." Id.
41. Smith, 783 F.2d at 1252. The effect of the Smith rule is not inconsequential. First, once an income tax on
the decedent's earnings is introduced, the position of the beneficiaries typically deteriorates. Second, in fairness,
the consequences of taxation in award calculation should be followed all the way through award disposition to the
"second tax."
[Vol. 15:291
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A. The "Congressional Intent"Argument
First, the court addressed the argument that, since under the Internal Revenue
Code the damage award is nontaxable to the recipient, Congress intended to
exempt jury awards, and that exemption should not be circumvented by reducing
such awards by the amount of income taxes the decedent would have paid on his
earnings.42 The court dismissed this argument because "[t]he commentators ha[d]
generally rejected this argument from legislative history and analysis."' Perhaps a
better rejection argument is to "take apart" a damage award by examining its the-
ory, i.e., why it is constructed as it is, and thereby reveal the confusion that has
arisen over award taxation in any form. The purpose of a wrongful death award is
not to recreate the household preinjury environment. Obviously that is impos-
sible. It is not even possible to recreate the total effects of the decedent's employ-
ment on the household. There are lost psychic and social benefits of the decedent's
work experience on the household that cannot be restored, in addition to the purely
financial benefits that can be approximated.
Instead, a wrongful death award is purely economic. It blends two economic
trends or variables into a lump sum value. One trend is "positive," the earnings
growth rate that normally would be experienced by a worker over the time of his
earning capacity. The other trend is "negative," the discount rate used to reduce
those future earnings to present value. The discount of future earnings is required
because money, as in a lump sum award, has earning power. If there were no dis-
count of that future income stream, the plaintiff would be overcompensated, since
the lump sum award could be invested and earn at some positive rate of interest.
4
42. Id. at 1255. Robert J. Nordstrom points to the considerable confusion among commentators and courts
between nontaxation of the award being received and taxation of a component in the award's construction (taxing
the decedent's earnings). Nordstrom, supra note 7, at 219. Nordstrom then suggests that "nearly unanimous" rul-
ings using gross rather than net earnings in calculating the award are the result of knowing awards are "tax free,"
and that such knowledge suggests (erroneously) that no tax consideration at all, i.e., applied at no stage of award
disposition, should be given. Id. at 219-28. In short, Nordstrom suggests that the confusion arises over extending
the tax-free passing of an award from the tortfeasor to the beneficiaries onto the (potential) tax on the decedent's
earnings in calculation of the award sum. Id. That point is a valid and significant distinction of this whole taxation
issue.
However, eliminating the confusion should not in itself prompt the conclusion that a tax amount equal to the
decedent's earnings should be deducted when the award is calculated. One could argue also that if mental energy
is to be devoted to elucidating that distinction, similar energy should be devoted to elucidating the full tax conse-
quences of the "second tax."
43. Smith, 783 F.2d at 1255 (citing Nordstrom, supra note 7, at 219; D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 8.8 (1973)). While the court was not always clear as to whether it was the award per se that was to be
taxed or whether the decedent's income was to be taxed (a case in point on the confusion Nordstrom observed,
see supra note 42), the decision in Huddell v. Levin, 395 F Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 573 F.2d 726 (3d
Cir. 1976), provides generally good background to the tax issue in wrongful death award calculations. In coun-
tering the defendant's argument for deduction of the income tax from the decedent's earnings in calculating the
award, the Huddell Court observed that if Congress taxed the award, which it could, then the "defendant[ I
would pay the entire loss" (i.e., the entire amount of the award), and the plaintiffs would get the entire loss, which
in fact they already do if there is no tax. Huddell, 395 F. Supp. at 85. The plaintiffs then pay tax on the interest
from investment of that award. The Huddell Court concluded: "Thus, the question is not whether plaintiffs are
'over-compensated,' but which party to the litigation should receive the benefit of the exemption of personal in-
jury awards from taxation." Id.
44. Thomas 0. Depperschmidt, Meeting the Defense Challenge to the Earning Power of a Lump Sum Award,
3 J. LEGAL ECON. 89, 91 (1993).
1995]
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With appropriate trend values incorporated into the formula, the sum so calcu-
lated is assumed to be invested. The yearly interest on that investment provides an
amount sufficient to pay the decedent's yearly, replicated "income" figure as well
as increase the fund so that future investment earnings will always be sufficient to
pay the yearly income. At the end of a designated time period corresponding to the
earning capacity of the decedent, the fund is exhausted.4"
A valid distinction on congressional intent can now be seen in the difference be-
tween the freedom from taxation of an award component in award construction
and freedom from taxation of the award sum itself received by beneficiaries. Im-
posing a tax on the decedent's earnings in the award construction can be viewed as
subtracting a living expense of the decedent that is not rightfully the beneficiaries'
in any event. However, receipt of a properly-constructed lump sum award tax free
can be viewed as the net value of the decedent's contribution to them and "right-
fully theirs." That rationale supports the conclusion that a tax might be levied (in
theory) on the decedent's earnings at the same time the tax is not imposed on the
award itself. That rationale, moreover, exists apart from the problem introduced
by another tax on the beneficiaries in the form of the tax on interest income from
the award.
B. The Argument: '7he Tax Is None
of the Defendant's Business"
Second, the income tax is" 'a matter between the plaintiff and the government
and is none of the defendant's business.' "46 The Smith Court discarded this argu-
ment as "inappropriate" by rejecting the implicit income tax deduction comparison
to the collateral source rule as it affects the defendant.47 Hence, just as the collat-
eral source rule "prevents a defendant from claiming the benefit of [a] decedent's
relationship to a third party, . . . this rule prevents the defendant from reducing the
award by virtue of the decedent's relationship to the government."'
Several points of clarification are pertinent here. The Smith Court declared a
distinction between the collateral source rule and the income tax deduction at the
outset. The court then approved the well-known benefits of employing the collat-
eral source rule (for example, it encourages potential victims to buy insurance)
without addressing directly the demerits of the income tax deduction. 9 Despite
45. Id. The court in McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 282 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.)
(quoting Stanley C. Morris & Robert J. Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax Law,
46 A. B.A. J. 274, 328 (1960)), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960), described the award amount as" 'that sum of
money which if invested at a fair rate of return will yield annually the amount by which the plaintiffs earning
capacity has been lessened and which will at time of end of the plaintiffs life expectancy be reduced to zero.'"
46. Smith, 783 F.2d at 1255 (citation omitted) (quoting DOBBS, supra note 43, § 8.8).
47. Id.
48. Id. Insurance benefits purchased by the plaintiff are probably the most common form of collateral source
benefit and the one cited by the Smith Court. Id.
49. Id.
[Vol. 15:291
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this "negative identification" as a collateral source,5" the tax deduction does affect
the size of the defendant's payment.
The argument that the "matter of taxes" is "none of the defendant's business"
has in the past addressed the uncertainty of the payment amount by the plaintiff,
not its dissimilarity to the collateral source rule. The amount of the decedent's tax
deduction in this sense is the "business of the defendant," since the size of the de-
fendant's payment obligation is material."
In fact, the argument regarding the tax not being the business of the defendant is
raised in what the Smith Court identified as the "third argument," not the second., 2
The Smith Court cited Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt 3 for the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case allowing inclu-
sion of the effect of income taxes on a decedent's future earnings. Specifically,
the Court said:
The amount of money that a wage earner is able to contribute to the support of his
family is unquestionably affected by the amount of the tax he must pay to the Federal
Government. It is his after-tax income, rather than his gross income before taxes,
that provides the only realistic measure of his ability to support his family.
55
The dissenting Justices in Liepelt argued persuasively for nondeduction of the
income tax from the decedent's earnings precisely because they felt the tax was
"none of the defendant's business. "6 Why did they think it was not the defendant's
business? The dissent argued that no one can say with certainty in a specific case
what the plaintiffs tax obligation is, given the "uncertainties, estimates, assump-
tions and complexities involved in computing and effectuating that subtraction.57
Therein lies the essence of the argument that the tax is "none of the defendant's
business." Because a tax obligation, of unknown magnitude, may or may not exist
for the plaintiff in an "award construction" setting, the defendant should not rou-
tinely obtain relief from its payment obligation in the face of that uncertainty. In-
deed, the Liepelt dissent insisted that the tax deduction certainly was not a
circumstance from which the tortfeasor should benefit.55
50. "The same economic and equitable justifications are clearly not applicable to income taxes." Id.
51. Clearly, the benefit gained by the defendant in having the award reduced by the amount of the decedent's
income tax is not a gain or loss to the government. The defendant gains in having a smaller payment obligation.
There is no actual revenue gain to the government in the deduction of income tax from the decedent's earnings,
however, since the decedent obviously will not be working and earning income subject to tax in the future. With
the "second tax," there is a "welfare loss" to the beneficiaries, while the government gains the amount of tax paid
on interest earned from the invested award.
52. Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc., 783 F.2d 1249, 1255 (5th Cir. 1986).
53. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
54. Id. at 493.
55. Id.
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C. The Argument that Tax Calculation Is Too Speculative
Third, the Smith Court noted the argument that the calculation of a person's in-
come taxes is "too speculative" an adjustment and "judicially time-consuming." 9
In approving language in Liepelt and in following that decision on this point (the
jury could consider evidence on income taxes as relevant), the Smith Court
rejected the "too speculative" argument largely on the counter-contention that
juries can handle the "exact sort of evidence" presented on tax issues. 0
D. A Fourth Argument: Liepelt and McWeeney
on the "Second Tax"
The majority position in Liepelt approved by the Smith Court was significant,
however, not only for its conclusion approving the deduction of income taxes, but
for what it did not say about the McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad61 decision it cited. The Liepelt decision does hint at the effect on award
size caused by taxation of award interest. Justice Stevens noted that the respondent
"point[ed] out that in discounting the estimate of future earnings to its present
value, the tax on the income to be earned by the damages award. . . [was] omit-
ted ."2 To this observation which affected most significantly the economic posi-
tion of the beneficiary, the Court's response was obscure:
Logically, it would certainly seem correct that this amount, like future wages,
should be estimated on an after-tax basis. But the fact that such an after-tax esti-
mate, if offered in proper form, would also be admissible does not persuade us that it
is wrong to use after-tax figures instead of gross earnings in projecting what the de-
cedent's financial contributions to his survivors would have been ....
The antecedent to "this amount" in the first sentence seemingly is "the tax on the
income to be earned by the damages award.1"64 However, the only sense to be made
of "this amount" is that Justice Stevens was referring to the net (i.e., "after tax")
59. Smith v. Industrial Constructors, Inc., 783 F.2d 1249, 1255 (5th Cir. 1986).
60. Id. Nordstrom suggests the reason courts have left the tax issue alone is that the calculation process is
lengthy, complicated, and speculative, and courts are content with "close enough." Nordstrom, supra note 7, at
228.
Fear of speculation forthcoming from a jury on the tax issue has caused one court to hedge the issue. It rea-
soned that although the jury should be instructed that a personal injury damages award is not taxable, it should
not also be instructed that any income realized from the award is taxable, the reason being that the latter instruc-
tion would cause the jury to enter into a field of speculation and would tend to confuse and distract the jury.
Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Mo. 1952).
In a commendably frank attempt at fairness in this matter, the court in Meehan v. Central Railroad, 181 F.
Supp. 594, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), said: "It is, of course, impossible to determine with exactness the future tax
rate, but just as it was necessary to face the reasonably probable realities in determining the future income tax to
be paid. . . , so must such realities be considered here."
This comment "answers" the Dempsey Court, which said: "In the case of income tax liability on future income
realized from investment of the award there is the additional imponderable of what income, if any, a particular
plaintiff would probably earn from investment thereof." Dempsey, 251 S.W.2d at 46.
61. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
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contribution that would have been made by the decedent to the household, not to
the tax itself. In stating the issue that way, the Court does not follow through with
the implications on the economic position of the household survivors of both the
decedent's income and the award interest earned being measured "after-tax." Had
it done so, it arguably would have reached a much different conclusion on whether
the decedent's income should be taxed.
Indeed, the second quoted sentence suggests that Justice Stevens missed en-
tirely the point of the respondent's observation. For the question raised by the re-
spondent was not about the rightness or wrongness of using after-tax figures per
se, or on the admissibility of using "after-tax estimate[s]."65 Obviously, the Court
could have deemed whatever evidence as admissible that it wanted to, i.e., it could
have treated the key components in award calculation on a pretax or an after-tax
basis or, as in Liepelt, treated one component (the decedent's income) after-tax
and one component (award interest) pretax, and so ignore the implications of the
"after-tax" treatment of award interest. The respondent instead was encouraging
consistency in treatment of taxes by the Court, i.e., asking the Court to consider
the economic position of survivors when the full consequences of double taxation
are analyzed.
Indeed, the respondent presumably would not have disagreed at all with the use
of after-tax earnings in the calculation process, so long as the after-tax effect of
both taxes - the tax on award interest and the tax on the decedent's income - were
recognized and factored into the calculation. The respondent's argument regarding
"opening the door" to tax consideration 66 sought consistent application of the tax
rules. "Other equally relevant evidence" included the full implications (double tax-
ation) of a rule requiring taxation in wrongful death award calculations, especially
including the economic position of the surviving householders.67
Despite ignoring these implications, the Court cited the Second Circuit's 1960
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the award's earnings.68 The McWeeney Court's observations on taxation of interest
earnings on a damage award went right to the heart of the issue. After describing
what an award does,69 the court noted:
This [award sum] takes into account the fact that money earns interest each
year; and it should be remembered that this interest is taxable. Therefore, if a
court is going to use income after taxes as a measure of [a] plaintiffs loss, it
must add back the taxes which would be due on the interest earned -else the
award would not fully compensate for the lOSS.
70
The McWeeney Court's insight is crucial to providing equitable tax treatment in
damage award calculations. Had it looked further into and behind Liepelt, the
Smith Court would have found that "fourth argument," one that it probably could
not have dismissed so easily. When beneficiaries are taxed on award interest
earned and on the decedent's income, that amounts to double taxation. The tort-
feasor benefits primarily in having the award reduced by the amount of the tax on
the decedent's income, and that reduction is at the expense of the plaintiffs award.
The plaintiff pays taxes twice, however, and no household should be taxed twice
on the same income. If a court ignores the tax on award earnings, it closes its eyes
to that double taxation.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE Two TAXES ON BENEFICIARIES
Are the effects of the two taxes on award calculation substantial? Does ignoring
a "second tax" change the position of beneficiaries significantly? The answers to
these questions are best demonstrated with numerical examples.
68. In reviewing the confusion surrounding taxation of wrongful death awards, the court in Meehan v. Central
Railroad, 181 F. Supp. 594, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), observed:
However, this non-taxability applies to the award itself, not necessarily to any income earned as a result
of the investment of the award. . . . [Tlhere is no indication that the interest on the award which repre-
sents the discounted amount will not be subject to taxation. Neither party disputes the contention that the
percentage of the total amount received over the period of 33 years which represents interest on the award
will be taxable.
In Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 282 P.2d 23, 32 (Cal. 1955), the Supreme Court of California noted the
existence of the "second tax" in rejecting the defendant's argument that an award was excessive:
They further do not take into consideration the facts that the computation of his wages, both past and
future, is based on only the sum he was receiving after taxes and "all various items" were deducted, and
that he would be obliged to pay taxes from any return upon invested moneys.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 302 n.7 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951),
the trial court identified the existence of the "second tax" but downplayed its significance: "[lit must be assumed
that the income from investments acquired with that sum would be taxable. If estimated tax is properly deducted
at one end, it should be added at the other."
Although the reference to the "second tax" in award disposition is relatively rare among courts, see also
Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Margevich v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 116 N.E.2d 914 (I11. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 861 (1953); Dempsey v. Thompson, 251
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1952).
69. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34,37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870(1960).
70. McWeeney, 282 F.2d at 37 (quoting Morris & Nordstrom, supra note 45, at 328).
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A. The Impact of Income Taxes on the Postinjury Household
There are two ways the surviving householder's position deteriorates because
of the court-imposed tax liability. First, the household is penalized in having the
interest income on its award taxed. The household is penalized further if the court
uses a tax on the decedent's income to reduce the base income amount for award
calculation purposes.
1. Taxation of Award Interest
As noted earlier, the household receives the award amount tax free. However,
the theory of the award is that it is invested and yields interest sufficient to replicate
the decedent's earnings stream. The award balance that remains after each yearly
payout earns interest at some designated rate, and the whole fund is exhausted at
the end of some designated time corresponding to the lifetime earning capacity of
the decedent.
The problem is those interest earnings on the award. They are taxable as ordi-
nary interest income. The household's earnings are decreased each year by the tax
paid on those earnings, so the relevant income position of the household is dimin-
ished. This tax on award interest is a reasonable certainty. It exists once an award
is given and invested, i.e., it happens without the court doing anything in respect
to taxation of the decedent's income.
Suppose that the decedent was a male, thirty-five years old. He had earned
$40,000 a year71 as the only household income. The wife and two children in the
surviving household receive an award, tax free, that yields $36,000 interest per
year, assuming a personal maintenance deduction for the decedent of ten percent
of gross income.72 As shown in Table 1, when the tax (using 1993 rates) is applied
to this household's interest income (i.e., earnings on the award) in a three-person
household with a standard deduction, the net, after-tax income of the household is
reduced to $19,975.
71. This income figure closely approximates the 1992 median income for a "householder" in the 35-44 age
range of $40,090. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES No. P60-184, MONEY INCOME OF
HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992 tbl. 1 (1993).
The assumption of a 10% of gross (pre-living expense) income of $40,000 for a personal maintenance value
for the decedent accords with a value of 12.31% on "net" income of $36,000. The value of 12.31% of pretax
income for a decedent in a four-person household is a good estimate, based on Department of Labor data. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 1990 tbl. 4 (Nov. 22, 1991).
72. While objective accuracy in determining the personal maintenance deduction is always desirable, it
should be noted that within normal ranges of personal maintenance values used in wrongful death litigation, the
actual figure is immaterial to the conclusion in these sample calculations. However, an extremely high personal
maintenance deduction effectively would eliminate most postinjury net income and perhaps all income tax liabil-
ity (if tax is considered by the court). Indeed, where a high personal maintenance value is used, there typically is
not much argument about taxation of any aspect of the award construction or disposition, since the net award
typically is minimal anyway. An example of a very high personal maintenance deduction is in Butler v. United
States, 726 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1984), where the Fifth Circuit, applying Mississippi law and citing Sheffield v.
Sheffield, 405 So. 2d 1314 (Miss. 1981), allowed a personal maintenance factor of 94 % of income where there
were no surviving children or spouse. Butler, 726 F.2d at 1067.
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Table 1
$40,000
-4,000 10 % personal maintenance of decedent
$36,000 net income
7,050 three exemptions (wife & two children)
5,450 standard deduction, head of household
$23,500 taxable income
3,525 tax
$19,975 net, after-tax income
An important question arises concerning the household's relative economic po-
sition posttort compared to pretort. Since the household's relative economic posi-
tion does deteriorate due to the tax, should the tortfeasor reimburse the household,
or should the household sustain that tax liability? There is intuitive appeal to the
argument that a household should pay tax on income. A tax obligation exists on all
who earn income. Households earning their income from award interest should
not be exempt from taxation under that reasoning.
2. The Tax on the Decedent's Income
Recall that once the tax of $3525 is imposed, damage theory suggests that this
net, after-tax income of $19,975 in Table 1 is the correct base amount for award
calculation purposes. After subtracting the decedent's personal living expenses
and the tax applied to the household's interest income postinjury, and increasing
the amount by an earnings growth rate over the years, $19,975 will maintain the
surviving family beneficiaries in the same relative economic position as before the
tort.
Consider now the defendant's argument for a second tax on the decedent's in-
come. By proposing that an additional tax be applied to the decedent's income, the
tortfeasor suggests that the position of the household should deteriorate even fur-
ther (below $19,975). A serious tax equity problem is found in the second tax,
since the household in its pretort condition was not required to pay two income
taxes.
Looking at the calculation from the tortfeasor's angle, the tortfeasor effectively
"saves" in award size the amount of the annual income tax subtracted from the
award interest (as household income). If the second tax (on the decedent's income)
is imposed, the defendant saves again in having the net, base earnings rate reduced
for award calculation purposes. However, to keep the household in the same rela-
tive economic position as before the tort, income must be raised back to $19,975,
i.e., a payment by the tortfeasor of the amount of the second tax is needed. The
adding and subtracting of the second tax becomes a meaningless exercise, of
course, and not worthy of the court's time.
The tortfeasor is responsible for the unfortunate situation created. Because of
the tortfeasor's action, there is a need for economic compensation in the form of
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an award, the need for earnings on the invested award (as income) to support the
household, and the need for the household to pay taxes on the award interest. The
tortfeasor may argue that the tax obligations of the surviving household are not his
concern. But that argument undermines the defense argument for the tax on the
decedent's earnings in the first place.
B. Complications in the Tax Model
Handling the tax and personal maintenance calculations is awkward in theory
and very difficult in practice. In developing Table 1 to illustrate tax derivation,
several simplifying procedures were used to avoid complications in applying in-
come taxes to wrongful death awards. Indeed, those complications lie at the root
of the concern of several courts that introducing taxation of the decedent's income
into award calculation invites speculation and uncertainty.7 3
First, there is a complication that must be addressed by any court that mandates
the subtraction of income taxes as living expenses. It is a fundamental, "catch 22"
kind of problem. Which of the two deductions should be made first from gross in-
come?
If the income tax is deducted first from gross income,74 the surviving house-
hold is overtaxed by the amount of the tax on that portion of the award represent-
ing the decedent's personal maintenance expenditures, since the household should
not pay tax on the amount of income to which it would not have had access in any
event. If the personal maintenance expenditures are deducted first from gross in-
come, the practical rule is violated that personal maintenance should be calculated
as a percentage of after-tax income. That is, the decedent realistically could not
have consumed any portion of his income used for income taxes.
The procedure adopted in Table 1 to illustrate the tax inequity also illustrates
the difficulty of developing a model. The decedent's personal maintenance is cal-
culated "after tax." However, to derive that after-tax value, it is necessary to "pre-
calculate" the tax on some gross income value, e.g., $40,000. A tax of $4125
results if that gross income figure is used (instead of $36,000). That figure over-
taxes the surviving household by $600 ($4125 less the tax of $3525 found in Table
1) since the $40,000 gross income includes the decedent's living expenses, which
are not income to the household. Effectively, the postinjury household is taxed as
if the decedent were still in the household.
73. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839(1975),
overruled by Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
282 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F Supp. 64, 89 (D.N.J.
1975), vacated, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (Ill. 1955);
Dempsey v. Thompson, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. 1952).
74. In the search of reported cases where calculation was made of the deduction for the decedent's income tax,
nothing but gross income was used as the base. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493 (1980);
Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F3d 563, 571 (5th Cir. 1994); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295, 303
(9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Muckleroy v. OPI Int'l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 937, 948 (S.D.
Tex. 1993), affd in part, 42 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 1994); Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 85 (D.N.J. 1975),
vacated, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
1995]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
Recall that this intractable problem which overtaxes the survivors thereby re-
duces the income figure used as the base in award calculation. Hence, problems in
the calculation process undercompensate the survivors at the outset.
The decedent's living expenses are a second complication. They are in fact an
unseparated part of the preinjury household's total expenses paid out of gross in-
come. (Effectively, the other members of the household already realize a lesser
per capita income preinjury by the amount of the decedent's personal consump-
tion.) They are separated in Table I to meet the requirement of Mississippi law
that living expenses be identified and deducted and to distinguish the preinjury
and the postinjury household conditions.
C. A Simple, Correct Approach to the Tax Issue
Table 1 is designed to show that, since the beneficiaries must pay tax on the
award interest7" (though not on the award itself) and thereby reduce their eco-
nomic position, taxing the decedent's income further diminishes their position.
The award reduced by that deduction is not adequate to accomplish what it is sup-
posed to do: keep the beneficiaries in the same relative economic position as
before the injury. To keep the household in that same position (i.e., considering
only the deduction of the decedent's personal living expenses), the household
should be treated for award calculation purposes as if no tax at all were levied on
the decedent's income.
This solution also overcomes the complicated and speculative aspects of award
calculation arising from the introduction of taxes. As noted earlier, those concerns
have been raised by many courts,76 although their significance was downplayed by
the Smith Court.
The caution of the 1922 Mississippi Supreme Court in Louisville & Nashville
Railway v. Garnett," about "making the decedent worth more dead than alive" if
living expenses of the decedent are not considered, is well taken. The flaw in the
legal argument that developed from that caution is that income taxes on the dece-
dent are like any other living expense when considering the theory of award calcu-
lation. However, taxes are unlike those living expenses precisely because the court
is tempted to impose them explicitly in the form of a tax on the decedent's income
on top of the tax already required on award interest received as income by the
household.
For fairness all around and for economy of effort without forsaking accuracy of
calculation, the tax on the decedent's earnings should not be levied. The obvious
75. The assumption that the amount of award interest earnings each year is just equal to the replicated income
payment is, for tax purposes, no longer unrealistic. It assumes that the award interest earnings can be sheltered
from tax and that only the annual replicated income payout is taxed when it is received as income.
The problem with the assumption is not the payout amount itself, but the composition of that payout. Some of
the award principal must be paid out each year in order to reduce the principal over time and allow it to be "zeroed
out" at the end of the decedent's lifetime earning capacity.
76. See supra note 73.
77.93 So. 241 (Miss. 1922).
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solution to the tax issue surrounding the decedent's income in damage award cal-
culation is to ignore that tax entirely.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of compensation in Mississippi wrongful death litigation is to
maintain the same relative economic position of beneficiaries-no more, no
less-than what it was while the decedent lived. That position is found by deter-
mining the decedent's net contribution to the surviving householders. The net con-
tribution is the decedent's income, less personal living expenses to which the
household would not have had access.
There is a first-impression, appealing argument that since the decedent was
taxed on his income while living, the calculation of a wrongful death award de-
signed to replicate his income for survivors should include a similar tax as a living
expense of the decedent. The identification of an income tax as "just another liv-
ing expense" supports that impression.
If the intent of the "tax as living expense" rule is to ensure the proper contribu-
tion amount the decedent would have made to beneficiaries had he lived, it does
not achieve that purpose. Indeed, despite its seeming attention to fairness, the rul-
ing works seriously to the detriment of the plaintiff. No household is obliged to pay
tax on income twice, but that is exactly what the tax on the decedent's income re-
quires.
Just as the Smith Court and courts in other jurisdictions now hold that it is
proper to allow only the present value of the decedent's estimated future earning
capacity to plaintiffs - not the actual, undiscounted amount - so also they should
adapt to the need for equity in tax treatment. In the present value discussion, the
change occurred because it was recognized that, due to the earning power of
money, there would be overcompensation of the plaintiff in theory if future pay-
ments were not discounted to present value. On the tax issue, the theory of award
calculation clearly demonstrates that, as taxation is introduced into the calcula-
tion, the surviving household must pay taxes on interest earnings, reducing its ec-
onomic position. Imposing an additional tax on the decedent's income mandates a
further, unwarranted decrease in the surviving household's economic position.
Moreover, the tortfeasor, if required to pay the income increase to permit house-
hold payment of the second tax without suffering a decline in its economic posi-
tion, would actually be as well off without the tax being applied. If the tortfeasor
insists on a tax on the decedent's earnings, the court in fairness should increase the
defendant's payments to compensate the beneficiaries for that second tax paid.
The Mississippi tax deduction rule, crystallized in Smith and requiring deduc-
tion of federal income tax from a wrongful death damage award, is deficient to the
extent that it does not examine the consequences of income taxation fully. Instead,
a policy of ignoring the tax entirely in award calculation is the simpler, more equi-
table, and more correct approach to handling the income tax deduction question.
That conclusion is warranted after examining the consequences of the double in-
come tax on both the surviving householders and the tortfeasor.
1995]

